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LABOR LAW
This section of the Tenth Circuit Survey will cover all major
labor law decisions with the exception of those cases decided
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' which are included
in the constitutional law section of the Survey. The Tenth Cir-
cuit's most significant decision in the area of labor law, Dartt v.
Shell Oil Co., 2 involved the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 19671 and is discussed in the case comment following the
overview.
OVERVIEW
I. LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT'-NATONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT 5
A. Unfair Labor Practices
In NLRB v. Dover Corp., I a supervisor threatened three em-
ployees with discharge if they continued their union activities
during an organizational campaign. No discharges actually oc-
curred, and the company's attorney gave oral assurances to the
employees that the threats were not authorized by the company.
In addition, an officer of the company had a notice posted stating
that supervisors are forbidden by law from threatening discharges
because of union activities. Thereafter, the same supervisor was
involved in a similar incident. Finding violations of section
8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act,7 the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) entered a remedial order and petitioned
the court of appeals for enforcement.
Although the supervisor did not have the power to hire or
fire, the Tenth Circuit found in the record "credible and substan-
tial proof on which the Board could rely ' 8 and held that the
employer is responsible for the coercive statements of the supervi-
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. II 1972).
2 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976).
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970).
Id. §§ 141-197 (1970).
Id. §§ 151-168 (1970).
No. 74-1577 (10th Cir., Apr. 12, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
No. 74-1577 at 10. The court deferred to the NLRB credibility findings, stating that
such findings are "peculiarily [sic] within the province of the hearing office and the
Board and are ordinarily entitled to acceptance on review." Id. at 8.
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sor "when employees would have just cause to believe that he was
acting for and on behalf of the company."9 Even though the union
had lost a certification election which occurred after the viola-
tions but prior to the court's decision, the Tenth Circuit ordered
enforcement of the remedial order, noting that such orders have
been enforced when needed "for [their] future effect."10
In Groendyke Transport, Inc. v. NLRB," the Tenth Circuit
declined to set aside NLRB orders arising from the discharge of
an employee for violating an overly broad no-distribution rule.
The NLRB found that the rule prohibiting employees from
"distributing. . .handbills or literature of any type on company
property during working hours"'" violated section 8(a)(1) of the
National Labor Relations Act 3 and that the discharge of an em-
ployee for distributing union literature on company property dur-
ing his nonworking hours violated sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act." In sustaining the Board's findings, the court noted that no
exceptions to the rule were provided for and that employees could
interpret the rule as prohibiting distributions on their own time
in nonwork areas; 5 absent proof of unusual justifying circumstan-
ces, such a rule violates the Act."
The NLRB also had found that four separate incidents of
questioning employees regarding union attitudes during the or-
ganizational drive were unlawful interrogations. 7 While noting
that an employer is not prohibited from disseminating its views
on the virtues of organization," the Tenth Circuit sustained the
Board's findings as being supported by substantial evidence on
the record as a whole and granted enforcement of the Board's
order. 9 In sustaining the Board's findings the court noted that the
Id. at 10 (citing Furr's, Inc. v. NLRB, 381 F.2d 562, 566 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 840 (1967)).
"0 No. 74-1577 at 14-15 (citing NLRB v. Raytheon Co., 398 U.S. 25 (1970)).
530 F.2d 137 (10th Cir. 1976).
" Id. at 140.
, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
" Id. § 158(a)(1), (3). See 530 F.2d at 139.
, 530 F.2d at 141. The rule prohibited distribution during "working hours" which
here was essentially 24 hours a day. Id. at 142 n.7.
11 Id. at 141 (citing Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 796, 803-04
(1945)).
,7 530 F.2d at 144.
" 530 F.2d at 143 & n.9. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1970).
" The court examined the company's entire course of conduct and held that
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discussions with the employees were "out of the ordinary" and
that the employer neither stated the purpose for the questions nor
gave any assurance against reprisal.20
In NLRB v. Lake Shore, Inc.21 two employees were dis-
charged for engaging in protected union activity. They later voted
under challenge in a certification election where their votes were
determinative. The NLRB ordered their reinstatement and certi-
fied the union as the exclusive bargaining representative.2 2 Desir-
ing to challenge the Board's reinstatement order and resulting
certification, the employer refused to bargain with the union;
whereupon the Board ordered it to do so after finding violations
of sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act. 1
The validity of the bargaining order depended on whether the
Board had properly ordered reinstatement.
The employer contended that there was insufficient evidence
to support the Board's findings, specifically alleging that there
was no showing of knowledge by it that the fired employees were
union organizers and that there was no showing of discriminatory
motive. The Tenth Circuit sustained the Board's decision, find-
ing that the circumstances of the case were sufficient to raise the
necessary inferences.24 The court stated that at the very least this
case fell within Judge Lewis' statement in Rocky Mountain Natu-
ral Gas Co. v. NLRB: "The discharge of qualified workers who
are also active unionists '. . . is a circumstance of suspicion which
may give rise to justified inference of violative discrimination'; in
such case 'the issue must ...be determined by the degree of
significance to be given to the employer's explanation of the rea-
son for the discharge.' "25 The administrative law judge's opinion,
which was adopted by the Board, found unpersuasive the em-
ployer's explanation that the firings were economically moti-
vated. Finding that this case was one that depended on the credi-
"[wihile the proof is not strong, we feel it supports the Board's inferences. ... 530
F.2d at 144.
Id.
2, No. 75-1716 (10th Cir., June 3, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
I ld. at 4.
' Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 6.
5Id. at 6-7, as quoted in American Sanitary Products Co. v. NLRB, 382 F.2d 53, 56
(10th Cir. 1967); Betts Baking Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 199, 204 (10th Cir. 1967).
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bility of witnesses, the court honored the Board's choice between
conflicting testimony."
In NLRB v. P.A.F. Equipment Co." an employer's refusal to
bargain with the certified bargaining representative was found by
the NLRB to be an unfair labor practice.2 The company claimed
that its refusal to bargain was justified because it had been de-
nied due process of law when its challenge of the NLRB election 9
was dismissed by the Regional Director without a hearing and
when its request for Board review was denied. The court affirmed
the NLRB's authority to determine whether an election should be
held" and ruled that the Board's refusal to grant a hearing on this
"nonlitigable issue" was not a denial of due process.3 '
In NLRB v. Auto Crane Co. 32 a wage increase and a thrift
plan were unilaterally implemented by the employer while a
collective bargaining agreement was in force. After a union re-
quest for negotiation was refused by the company, the NLRB
ordered the company to bargain. 33 The Tenth Circuit refused en-
forcement on the ground that the agreement contained an effec-
tive waiver of the statutory right to bargain .34 The court held that
the language of the waiver- was sufficiently clear to deny this
No. 75-1716 at 9.
-7 528 F.2d 286 (10th Cir. 1976).
2 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5) (1970).
The challenge, based upon marginal participation in the organizational campaign
by supervisors, was raised by the company before the certification election. The charge
was filed four and one-half months before the election and the court observed that this
interval afforded ample time in which to offset the activity of the supervisors. The vote
in favor of the union was 83 to 40. 528 F.2d at 287.
" 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1970). See NLRB v. Waterman S.S. Co., 309 U.S. 206, 226
(1940).
1' 528 F.2d at 287.
32 536 F.2d 310 (10th Cir. 1976).
See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
536 F.2d at 312. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). The contractual waiver provision and
the issues involved were the same as those considered in NLRB v. Southern Materials Co.,
447 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1971).
The provision stated in part:
[The Company and the Union, for the life of this Agreement, each volun-
tarily and unqualifiedly waive [sic] the right and each agrees that the other
shall not be obligated to bargain collectively with respect to any subject or
matter referred to, or covered in this Agreement, or with respect to any
matter or subject not specifically referred to or covered in this Agreement,
even though such subjects or matters may not have been within the knowl-
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particular remedy to the union"e and that, although the company
had no right to unilaterally change a term of the contract, it did
have the right to refuse to negotiate the change. 7
In a brief dissent, Judge Doyle stated that the company's
unilateral act changed the terms of the contract and that the old
agreement was no longer operative. Consequently, the union was
not bound by its waiver of bargaining rights and could lawfully
demand, and the company could not refuse, to bargain pursuant
to section 8(a)(5).
In NLRB v. Glaziers & Glassworkers Local 558 3 the union
picketed a construction site to protest the nonunion status of the
general contractor. When a sub-contractor's union employees re-
fused to cross the picket line and the sub-contractor indicated
that nonunion employees would be hired to complete the job, a
union representative implied that physical violence and destruc-
tion of property would result. The union contended that these
statements merely reflected actual conditions in labor disputes
and did not constitute coercion. 0 The NLRB held that these were
threats of prohibited activity4 and ordered the union to cease and
desist. The court found substantial evidence to support the
Board's finding of fact and ordered enforcement.2
B. Damages
In Fleming Building Co. v. Northeastern Oklahoma Building
& Construction Trades Council4 3 a company appealed a judgment
denying its claim for damages under section 303.44 The Tenth
Circuit agreed with the company that the standard of proof in
edge or contemplation of either or both parties at the time they negotiated
or signed this Agreement.
536 F.2d at 312 (emphasis supplied by the court).
3' The NLRB order was based solely on section 8(a)(5), addressing refusal to bargain.
The court pointed out that "[tihe Union by the clear waiver of the right to bargain has
traded that remedy for other contractual or legal remedies as it may do." 536 F.2d at 312.
37 Id.
11 Id. (Doyle, J., dissenting).
.39 No. 75-1819 (10th Cir., June 3, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
40 Id. at 3-4.
" 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1970).
No. 75-1819 at 5-6. See, e.g., NLRB v. Acker Indus., Inc., 460 F.2d 649 (10th Cir.
1972).
43 532 F.2d 162 (10th Cir. 1976).
" 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1970).
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section 303 actions arising from unlawful strike activity should be
a preponderance of the evidence and not the "clear proof" 5 stan-
dard applied by the trial court. However, it held that this error
was harmless because, even under the less rigorous standard, the
damages alleged by the company were speculative and uncer-
tain."
In International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 12
v. A-1 Electric Service, Inc. 7 the court decided that, in a section
30148 suit to recover damages for breach of a collective bargaining
agreement, general contract law should apply to the measure of
damages. 9 The appropriate measure was held here to be that
amount which the company would have been required to pay to
the various union funds had it not violated the hiring hall and
union shop provisions of the agreement.
50
In fixing a cutoff date for measurement of damages, the
Tenth Circuit rejected the suggestion of the trial court that dam-
ages should be the amount owed the union as of the date the
union withdrew its members from employment with the com-
pany; such a result "would tend to weaken the enforceability of
collective bargaining agreements and allow the breaching party
to disregard the agreement and suffer only a minimal penalty."
'51
It also rejected a union proposal that the cutoff date should be
either the time of filing the complaint or the start of the trial
because both would encourage delayed filings to increase recover-
ies. Instead, the court settled on the end of the contractual year
as the most reasonable cutoff date for the measurement of dam-
ages.5 2
,1 The "clear proof" standard was drawn from the language of section 6 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1970). The Tenth Circuit cited Ramsey v. Mine Workers,
401 U.S. 302, 310 (1971), as implying that the preponderance of the evidence standard
should apply in all civil actions against labor unions except suits brought under section
6. 532 F.2d at 164.
11 532 F.2d at 165.
47 535 F.2d 1 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 94 (1976).
- 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
,1 535 F.2d at 3.
Id. (citing Interstate United Corp. v. White, 388 F.2d 5, 7 (10th Cir. 1967)). See
also 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACrs §§ 992, 1002 (1964).
11 535 F.2d at 3.




In Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Local 2-124 v. American
Oil Co. " the Tenth Circuit affirmed a lower court dismissal of a
union suit to compel arbitration of a grievance arising from the
compulsory disability retirement of an employee. Although one
clause in the collective bargaining agreement provided that
"disputes concerning disciplinary action resulting in loss of pay"
were arbitrable,54 another clause, expressly excluding disputes
concerning the status of employees under the company retire-
ment plan, was given effect. The court declined to equate the
employee's retirement with discharge, thus not invoking the ac-
knowledged "national policy that doubts are to be resolved in
favor of arbitrability.'"'s
In Reid Burton Construction, Inc. v. Carpenters District
Council56 the court considered arbitrability of both a company
claim for damages arising from a union's alleged violation of the
no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement, and the
issue of whether the union's assertion of arbitrability was barred
by alleged "evasive" and "dilatory" pleading and procedural tac-
tics in the suit. The trial court, finding that both issues were
arbitrable, had dismissed the company's damage claim.
In deciding that the damage claim based on the no-strike
clause should be submitted to arbitration, the Tenth Circuit used
a two-part test:
(1) Whether the grievance and arbitration provisions were wholly
employee and union initiated or could be initiated by either the
employees or the employer, and
(2) whether disputes over the violation of no-strike clauses were
intended by the parties to be subject to grievance and arbitration
proceduress?
Although the language of the agreement was somewhat ambigu-
ous, 5 the court interpreted it as allowing either party to initiate
53 528 F.2d 252 (10th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 253.
Id. at 254. See, e.g., Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
584-85 (1960).
535 F.2d 598 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 907 (1976).
'7 535 F.2d at 601. The test was distilled from the holdings in two Supreme Court
cases: Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962); Atkinson v.
Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
535 F.2d at 602.
1977
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grievance procedures for the application or interpretation of its
terms. The provisions were also read as broad enough to include
arbitration of disputes concerning the no-strike clause.
The Tenth Circuit disagreed, however, with the lower court's
holding that, where the issue litigated in a section 30111 action is
held to be arbitrable, equitable defenses to arbitration must also
be decided by the arbitrator. The trial court had relied on
Operating Engineers Local 150 v. Flair Builders, Inc."° in which
the issue of laches, arising from the failure of one party to pro-
perly make a dispute known to the other, was held to be a proper
subject for arbitration. The Tenth Circuit distinguished Flair
Builders, limiting its applicability to those situations in which
the equitable defense to arbitration arises from the misconduct
of a party outside the court proceeding and where the scope of the
arbitration clause is broad enough to support a finding that the
parties intended such a dispute to be arbitrable."' The court
found not only that the requisite intent was not present in the
case at bar but that:
Indeed, even had the parties so intended, we would conclude that
such an agreement would clearly exceed the proper subject matter
of a collective bargaining agreement and would not be enforceable
in court; it would be improper for the prospective parties of a lawsuit
to attempt by contract to bind the exercise of a court's inherent
judicial function .z
The case was remanded for determination of whether this equita-
ble defense, arising solely during the course of the trial, bars
arbitration of the underlying dispute.6 3 If so, the lower court,
under its section 301 jurisdiction, would be able to decide the
dispute on its merits.
Redstone Workers Association v. Mid-Continent Coal &
Coke Co. 64 involved payments made by trustees of a welfare trust
fund created under a collective bargaining agreement. In response
to an Association challenge of expenditures for employee trans-
portation, the trial court certified questions as to the validity of
29 U.S.C. § 301 (1970).
'o 406 U.S. 487 (1972).
535 F.2d at 603.
" Id. at 604.
63 Id.
11 No. 75-1257 (10th Cir., Dec. 22, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
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the expenditures under the agreement, their legality under sec-
tion 186,65 and an accounting to an arbitrator. Before the arbitra-
tor had ruled, the parties entered into a new agreement on em-
ployee transportation. The lower court dismissed the Associa-
tion's claims for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief on
the grounds of lack of a case or controversy and mootness and,
although adopting the arbitrator's finding that the payments
were violative of section 186, held that liability for the illegal
expenditures must be determined under state law.66 The Tenth
Circuit affirmed the lower court decision with the exception of the
certification of the question of legality which went beyond the
permissible scope of an arbitrator's authority to resolve questions
of interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, 7 but ruled
this was harmless error in light of the ultimate dismissal. 8
The union in Local 2-477, Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers
v. Continental Oil Co."0 sought to enforce7" an arbitration award.
Two grievances, both arising from overtime outside of job classifi-
cations, were processed through the collective bargaining agree-
ment's grievance procedures to the point of submission to an
arbitrator. However, only one grievance was actually submitted,
and on motion by the union, made over written protest but with-
out appearance by the company, the arbitrator agreed to consoli-
date the two grievances. The Tenth Circuit held that the arbitra-
tor had no authority to consider a grievance added unilaterally
by a party or the arbitrator7 and, therefore, agreed to order en-
forcement of only that part of the arbitrator's award dealing with
the properly submitted grievance.7"
The scope of an arbitrator's authority was also considered in
Campo Machining Co. v. Local 1926, International Association of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers.73 One provision in the collec-
29 U.S.C. § 186 (1970).
" No. 75-1257 at 5.
" See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 53-54 (1974).
" No. 75-1257 at 6-7.
, 524 F.2d 1048 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976).
o See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970).
" 524 F.2d at 1050. An issue not submitted to an arbitrator cannot be the subject of
an arbitration award. Retail Store Employees Union Local 782 v. Sav-On Groceries, 508
F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1975).
11 524 F.2d at 1051.
" 536 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1976).
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tive bargaining agreement called for discharge, demotion, or dis-
cipline of an employee only with "good and sufficient cause."'"
Another authorized the company to make "reasonable" shop
rules if they were not in conflict with other provisions of the
agreement." An employee was discharged under a rule calling for
discharge for leaving the plant during the workshift without per-
mission. One employee left after an argument with his foreman
over tools which were needed but not readily available. Pursuant
to the agreement's arbitration clause, the resulting grievance was
submitted to an arbitrator. Considering the particular circum-
stances surrounding the discharge, the arbitrator decided that,
although the rule was reasonable, the employee's violation did
not constitute "good and sufficient cause" for a discharge and
ordered a lesser penalty." The company sought to have the award
set aside under section 30177 and was granted summary judgment
by the trial court. The Tenth Circuit stated that when an arbitra-
tor merely "interprets and applies the collective bargaining
agreement and his award is rooted in the agreement, the arbitra-
tor's decision on the merits is final and not reviewable." 5 Finding
that the arbitrator confined himself to interpreting and applying
the collective bargaining agreement, the court held that the arbi-
trator was within his authority and reversed and remanded the
case for an order enforcing his award.7"
II. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS AcT8
The Tenth Circuit considered the equal pay for equal work s'
and the overtime 2 sections of the FLSA in Brennan v. South
Davis Community Hospital.' The Secretary of Labor claimed
that female aides and maids had been paid less than male order-
" Id. at 331.
75 Id.
" The arbitrator ordered the employee's reinstatement with back pay, subject to the
company's right to suspend him for no more than one month from the date of the rule's
violation. Id. at 332.
" 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
" 536 F.2d at 332 (footnote omitted) (relying on United Steelworkers of America v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960)).
1, 536 F.2d at 334.
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970) (hereinafter cited as FLSA).
Id. § 206(d)(1).
" Id. § 207.
538 F.2d 859 (10th Cir. 1976).
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lies and janitors for equivalent work. The court noted that only
"substantial equality of skill, effort, and responsibility as to the
jobs actually performed" 84 need be proven to sustain the Secre-
tary's charge 5 and rejected the hospital's contention that order-
lies performed "extra tasks"" which aides did not. The court
examined the "extra tasks" and concluded that both aides and
orderlies were engaged primarily in basic patient care and that
"[djifferences in the kind of effort expended but not significant
in amount or degree will not support a wage differential.""
Likewise, the "extra tasks" argument was rejected in the
case of the maids and janitors. Both were found to be involved in
general cleaning activities, and the additional tasks8 required of
janitors, which tasks involved greater physical exertion, were too
insubstantial to justify unequal wages.89
A hospital's claim that an x-ray technician came within the
"professional capacity" exception" to the FLSA's overtime provi-
sions6 ' was denied. The court of appeals accepted the lower
court's finding that the technician's work was not sufficiently
intellectual and varied in character to bring him within the ex-
ception 92
In Dunlop v. Board of Regents for Oklahoma Agriculture &
Mechanical Colleges" the Secretary of Labor, appealing an ad-
verse district court judgment, sought to recover overtime on be-
half of a security guard and the cafeteria cooks of a junior college.
Id. at 861 (emphasis in original) (quoting Brennan v. Prince William Hosp. Corp.,
503 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975)).
m 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1970).
" These tasks included weighing bedridden patients, setting up traction, cardio-
pulmonary resuscitation, using the autoclave, and carrying heavy items. 538 F.2d at 861.
Id. at 862.
Janitors filled a soft drink machine, carried garbage cans, and removed snow. The
evidence showed that these activities took little time and that maids performed some tasks
that janitors did not, such as cleaning bathrooms and stripping and making beds. Id. at
863-64.
Id. at 864.
" 29 U.S.C. § 213(1) (1970).
" Id. § 207.
" 29 U.S.C. § 213 provides that the definition of "professional capacity" will be found
in regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor. The court deferred to the appropri-
ate regulation, 29 C.F.R. 541.3 (1975), which defines a professional as one who consistently
uses his discretion and judgment in work that is not routine, but is predominantly intellec-
tual and varied in character. 538 F.2d at 865.
" No. 75-1188 (10th Cir., Dec. 15, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
1977
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The Tenth Circuit held that the cafeteria did not come within the
exemption provided for retail or service food establishments94 and
awarded the overtime.
The court also reversed the district court's judgment that the
Secretary could not recover overtime pay on behalf of a college
security guard who had worked at a State Athletic Association-
sponsored basketball tournament on campus but who was paid
from gate receipts rather than directly from the college. He was
held to be furthering the interests of the school by helping to
provide "for the safety of the participants and spectators."95 The
guard's contract did not specify an hourly rate. However, for the
purpose of determining an hourly wage for the computation of the
overtime compensation due, his salary was divided by the agreed
weekly work hours."A
In Dunlop v. Gray-Goto, Inc.,97 another case arising from the
failure to pay overtime, the court held that fringe benefits in the
form of paid vacations, bonuses, and insurance" may not be set
off against overtime compensation due under the FLSA. A pri-
vate agreement between the employer and employees as to the
substitution of these benefits for the right to collect overtime pay
was held not to be an effective waiver "of a right so charged or
colored with public interest."9 The company's bookkeeping sys-
tem, which showed employees as receiving overtime pay when
they had actually received their regular rate of pay for all hours
worked, was in violation of the FLSA's recordkeeping provi-
sions,'0 notwithstanding the company's "good faith" defense. 0'
29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(18) (1970).
" No. 75-1188 at 9. In so holding, the court relied on the legislative history of the Act,
amendments to the Act, the administrative regulations (29 C.F.R. 779.316 (1975)), and
Hodgson v. Duke Univ., 460 F.2d 172 (4th Cir. 1972).
" No. 75-1188 at 11. See Triple "AAA" Co. v. Wirtz, 378 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1967).
V7 528 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1976).
11 These benefits are excluded from the calculation of an employee's "regular rate of
pay" under section 7, 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(1)-(2), (4) (1970).
11 528 F.2d at 795 (citation omitted) (quoting Brooklyn Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697
(1945)).
'® 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(5) (1970); 29 C.F.R. § 516.2 (1975).
"' The time cards accurately reflected the hours worked, but the figures were manip-
ulated when transcribed onto payroll cards. The company president testified that he had
been told "that was the way the records were supposed to be kept .... " 528 F.2d at 795.
VOL. 54
LABOR LAW
The case was remanded for a determination of whether the viola-
tions were "willful" under section 255.10'
Nancy A. Hopf
TIME LIMITATIONS FOR FILING UNDER THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir.
1976)
INTRODUCTION
In Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., I the Tenth Circuit of Appeals gave
an expansive interpretation of the procedural requirements of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,2 an interpreta-
tion contrary to that previously given in this circuit.3 The ADEA
was enacted in 1967,' with the stated purpose of promoting the
employment of older persons based on their ability and experi-
ence by prohibiting discrimination on the basis of age.5
Plaintiff Dartt was within the class protected by the Act and
" 29 U.S.C. § 255 (1970).
539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'g 10 F.E.P. Cases 844 (N.D. Okla. 1975).
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970) [hereinafter cited as ADEA]. The procedural require-
ments for the Act are in section 626(d) which reads in pertinent part:
No civil action may be commenced by any individual under this section until
the individual has given the Secretary not less than sixty days' notice of an
intent to file such action. Such notice shall be filed-
(1) within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful prac-
tice occurred .. . .
Law v. United Air Lines, Inc., 519 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1975); Burgett v. Cudahy Co.,
316 F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan. 1973). Both of these cases held that section 626(d)(1) was a
jurisdictional prerequisite to the maintenance of suit under the ADEA.
For a general discussion of the ADEA, see Agatstein, The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 A Critique, 19 N.Y.L.F. 309 (1973); Freed & Dowell, The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 196 (1972); Gillan, The
Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act Revisited, 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 761
(1976); Levien, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Statutory Requirements and
Recent Developments, 13 DuQ. L. REv. 227 (1974); Comment, Procedural Aspects of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 36 U. PIr. L. REv. 914 (1975).
Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602.
29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1970). The Act forbids discrimination against persons who are
at least forty years of age but less than sixty-five. Id. § 631.
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claimed she had been discharged because of her age. She had
failed, however, to file a notice of intent to sue within 180 days
from her discharge, as is required by section 626(d)(1) of the
ADEA. The defendant-employer moved to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, and the district court granted this
motion.' The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the ADEA's
notice requirement is not jurisdictional but is a procedural condi-
tion precedent to suit.' By classifying the notice requirement as
procedural rather than jurisdictional, the court made it possible
for plaintiffs in ADEA cases to file notice after the 180-day period
and then bring suit, provided there were equitable factors justify-
ing the delay. To reach this result, the court analogized the 180-
day period during which notice must be filed to a statute of limi-
tations.' Traditionally, statutes of limitations have been subject
to tolling9 and estoppel.' 0 Had the court viewed the 180-day pe-
riod as jurisdictional, the district court would have lost all juris-
diction after expiration of this period and would have been unable
to use equity on the plaintiff's behalf to preserve her right of
action."
I. FACTS
Shell maintained that its reason for terminating Mrs. Dartt
on July 31, 1973, was that a reorganization in its credit card
department had left her without work." Mrs. Dartt was then
fifty-one years of age. Believing she had been discharged because
of her age, she sought the assistance of an attorney who told her
that she should instead contact the United States Department of
Labor. As a result of this advice, Mrs. Dartt met on August 9,
1973, with the Assistant Area Director of the Wage and Hour
Division of the Department of Labor, Mr. Speer.'3 He interviewed
her regarding the discharge, filled out the Department's com-
plaint form, and told Mrs. Dartt that he would investigate the
10 F.E.P. Cases at 851.
539 F.2d at 1260.
Cases holding, in other circumstances, that a statute of limitations may be tolled
include: American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974); Burnett v. New York
Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424 (1965).
* 3 POMEROY'S EQurrY JURISPRUDEN E § 917 (5th ed. 1941).
I d. § 812.
6 WEST'S FEDERAL PRACTICE MANUAL § 7364 (2d ed. 1970).




alleged discrimination. When she inquired how long the investi-
gation would take, Speer responded that it might take a year. 4
Speer advised Shell of Mrs. Dartt's complaint and attempted
conciliation. After several meetings, Speer concluded that his
efforts at conciliation were unsuccessful and then adopted an
investigative posture. At this juncture Shell agreed to prepare
statistical information on its hiring and promotion practices to
facilitate this investigation. 5
On March 5, 1974, Speer, having not yet received the re-
quested information from Shell, advised Mrs. Dartt by letter that
there would be some delay in completing the investigation. This
letter discussed Mrs. Dartt's private right to sue, and enclosed a
pamphlet concerning the provisions of the ADEA, specifically
pointing out the time limitations precedent to filing one's own
lawsuit."' Plaintiff testified that Speer's letter and the pamphlet
constituted her first actual notice of both her right to bring a
private action and the 180-day notice requirement. Upon receipt
of this letter, Mrs. Dartt immediately retained private counsel.
On March 14, 1974, 216 days after the alleged discriminatory
discharge, Mrs. Dartt's attorney gave notice to the Department
of Labor of her intention to file a private action for violation of
the ADEA. 17
II. FINDINGS OF THE COURT
The district court rejected Mrs. Dartt's contention that the
180-day filing period was directory rather than jurisdictional as
being "neither supported by authority nor reason."'" As for plain-
tiff's contention that she had given sufficient notice of her intent
to sue by orally informing the Department that she had been
discharged because of her age, the court found the mandate of
section 626(d)(1) required something more: "[T]he mere regis-
tration of a complaint of age discrimination with the local wage
and hour division of the Department of Labor cannot be held by




'7 On May 16, 1974, Speer notified Mrs. Dartt's counsel that the Department's efforts
had proved unsuccessful, and that she was free to take whatever action she wished. Mrs.
Dartt filed a class action on May 21, 1974. 539 F.2d at 1258.
'1 10 F.E.P. Cases at 846.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
626(d)."' s5 Plaintiff's final argument to the district court was that
the 180-day period was tolled when she filed her complaint, be-
cause the Department failed to advise her of her right to sue until
the 180-day period had expired. On this issue, the court held that
Mrs. Dartt had presumptive and constructive knowledge of the
provisions of the ADEA, and refused to toll the 180-day filing
period. 0
On review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court
that Mrs. Dartt's complaint to the Department did not constitute
notice as required by section 626(d)(1). 21 However, as to the re-
maining two issues on appeal, whether the 180-day filing period
was a jurisdictional prerequisite in the sense that it could never
be extended, and if not, whether the facts of the case warranted
equitable modification, the court of appeals reversed the district
court.
2
The court, while admitting that there was ample authority
to support the trial court's conclusion that compliance with sec-
tion 626(d) was a "'jurisdictional prerequisite' to any private
action under the ADEA," nevertheless reversed the district court
and found that failure to comply was not an absolute bar to
bringing an ADEA private action;2 3 however, as seen by the court
of appeals, the notice requirement is a condition precedent to the
filing of a private action which cannot be waived, but which
should be subject to possible tolling and estoppel.24 In reaching
this conclusion, the court relied on the legislative history of the
ADEA and cases giving a liberal reading to a similar notice re-
quirement in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.25
1" Id. at 848. For a case holding that oral notice would suffice, see Woodford v. Kinney
Shoe Corp., 369 F. Supp. 911 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
10 The district court based its finding that plaintiff had presumptive notice on the
axiom that all persons are charged with knowledge of the provisions of statutes. 10 F.E.P.
Cases at 848. Although Mrs. Dartt had testified that she had never seen any posted notices
regarding the ADEA, the court also charged her with constructive knowledge, based on
posted notices at Shell "which would lead a reasonable person to know or to inquire into
his legal rights under the ADEA." Id. at 848-49. Such notices are required to be posted
by 29 U.S.C. § 627 (1970).
21 539 F.2d at 1259.
Id. at 1260-62.
Id. at 1259.
24 Id. at 1260-61.
Id.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. 11 1972) [hereinafter referred to as Title
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Although the court expressed its reliance on the legislative
history of the Act to support its holding, it did not discuss por-
tions of that history which it considered pertinent." Interestingly,
other cases which have used the Act's legislative history have held
that the notice requirement is mandatory, i.e., of a jurisdictional
nature. 7 These courts have placed great weight on the changes
made in the procedural aspects of the bill between the time it was
introduced and the time it was enacted."8 The ADEA as originally
proposed contained enforcement proceedings similar to those
under Title VII.11 The bill as adopted, however, rejected these
procedural proposals, incorporating instead the enforcement
techniques of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.30 The oppo-
nents of the bill as proposed claimed it would cause the same
delays "which plague so many of our agencies, such as the EEOC
The procedures for filing civil suit under Title VH are similar to those under the
ADEA. Proceedings under Title VII are initiated by the aggrieved party's filing of a charge
of unlawful employment practices with the Commission. The charge must be filed within
180 days of the alleged unlawful practice. Within 180 days of the filing of such charge, if
no civil action has been filed by the Commission or the Attorney General of the United
States, and no conciliation agreement has been entered into, the aggrieved party should
receive a "right to sue" letter. The aggrieved party must file a civil action within 90 days
of the receipt of such letter or lose the right to sue. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e), -5(f). For
articles discussing Title VII, see Casey & Slaywood, Procedural Aspects of Title VII
Litigation: Pitfalls for the Unwary Attorney, 7 U. TOL. L. REv. 87 (1975); Dotsey, Equal
Employment Opportunity-A Brief History and the New Federal Approach Through
Affirmative Action, 8 FORUM 100 (1972); Employment Discrimination: A Title VII
Symposium, 34 LA. L. REV. 540 (1974); The Second Decade of Title VII: Refinement of
the Remedies, 16 WM. & MARY L. REv. 433 (1975). For the legislative history of the ADEA,
see S. REp. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967).
" The court reached its conclusion after "examining the cases and the legislative
history" under the ADEA. 539 F.2d at 1259.
" Hiscott v. General Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1975); Powell v. Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 494 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1974); Burgett v. Cudahy Co., 361 F. Supp. 617 (D.
Kan. 1973).
" Powell v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 494 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1974); Vasquez v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 1353, 1355 (D.P.R. 1975).
S. 830, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
658.
, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970). Section 626(e) of the ADEA makes applicable 29
U.S.C. § 255 (1970), the statute of limitations contained in the Portal-to-Portal Act of
1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262 (1970). Under section 255(a) an action must be brought within
two years from the time the cause of action accrues. Therefore, there are two time limita-
tions built into the ADEA: Notice of intent to sue must be given within 180 days of the
discriminatory act, and, once such notice has been given, an action must be brought
within two years of the discriminatory act.
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and the NLRB . . . . By utilizing the courts rather than
[administrative bodies] as the forum to hear cases arising under
the law, these delays may be largely avoided.'
On appeal, Mrs. Dartt argued that these changes in proce-
dures under the ADEA supported the conclusion that failure to
give notice within the 180-day period did not necessarily divest
the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Especially in light of the
expressed congressional concern for a speedy determination of the
rights of older workers, Mrs. Dartt urged, it would be more in
keeping with the intent of the ADEA to construe the 180-day
period as directory in nature.2
In adopting plaintiff's interpretation of the legislative history
and her argument that section 626(d)(1) should be construed as
directory, the court of appeals relied on cases which had given
similar time limitations in Title VII a liberal reading. For exam-
ple, Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc.3" compared the
Title VII requirement for the filing of a charge of discrimination
within 180 days of the alleged discrimination to a statute of limi-
tations. It found equitable modifications such as tolling and es-
toppel applicable. 4 Although Reeb and Dartt in essence reached
the same conclusion, the facts in each case were significantly
different. In Reeb, the plaintiff had been deceived by the em-
ployer into believing that her termination was the result of a
limitation of funds. It was only after the statutory time period for
filing a charge of discrimination had passed that the plaintiff
discovered her position had subsequently been refilled by an al-
legedly less qualified male. The court in Reeb held: "[T]he
ninety day period did not begin to run in the present case until
the facts that would support a charge of discrimination under
Title VII were apparent or should have been apparent to a person
with reasonable prudent regard for his rights similarly situated to
" Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings on S. 830 and S. 788 Before the
Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 24 (1967) (statement of Sen. Javits).
31 Brief for Appellant at 9-12, Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976).
For a discussion of the use of legislative action on proposed amendments to a bill as an
extrinsic aid in statutory construction, see 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 48.18 (4th ed. 1973).




the plaintiff."3 Thus, the equitable modification fashioned in
Reeb was based on the wrong of the employer. As will be seen, in
every case, except Dartt, in which the time limitations of the
ADEA have been tolled, the decision has been based on a wrong
done by the employer.
3
1
III. OTHER JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 626(d)(1)
While litigation under the ADEA has been limited, increased
public awareness of the Act and its prohibitions has led to an
increase in the number of suits filed under the Act. 7 In the years
immediately after the ADEA was passed, the trend was to find
the procedural requirements of the Act to be jurisdictional, i.e.,
mandatory in nature. 38 However, recently there has been a move-
ment, albeit tentative, in the direction of construing the proce-
dural requirements more liberally. 3
The first case to interpret section 626(d)(1) was Cochran v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Co.4" In considering the effect to be given
the requirement that notice of intent to sue be filed within 180
days, the court found that use of the word "shall" in the statute
indicated that the requirement was mandatory rather than direc-
3 Id. at 931. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §
4(a), 86 Stat. 104, amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970) by extending the time for filing
charges with EEOC from ninety to one hundred and eighty days after the occurrence of
the alleged unlawful act.
"' See text accompanying notes 64-67 infra.
7 Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975); Wilson v. Sealtest Foods
Div., 501 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1974); Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212 (5th
Cir. 1974); Brennan v. Reynolds & Co., 367 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Hodgson v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
Eklund v. Lubrizol Corp., 529 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1976); Woodburn v. LTV Aero-
space Corp., 531 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1976); Hiscott v. General Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 632 (6th
Cir. 1975); Law v. United Air Lines, Inc., 519 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1975); Powell v. South-
western Bell Tel. Co., 494 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1974); Brohl v. Singer Co., 407 F. Supp. 936
(M.D. Fla. 1976); Hughes v. Beaunit Corp., 12 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 11,092 (E.D.
Tenn. May 19, 1976); Mizuguchi v. Molokai Elec. Co., 411 F. Supp. 590 (D. Hawaii 1976);
Raynor v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 400 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Va. 1975); Burgett v. Cudahy
Co., 361 F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan. 1973); Gebhard v. GAF Corp., 59 F.R.D. 504 (D.D.C. 1973);
Cochran v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Co., 376 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. La. 1971).
" Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 525 F.2d 92 (8th Cir. 1975); Smith v. Schlitz
Brewing Co., 12 F.E.P. Cases 1494 (D.N.J. 1976); McGinley v. Burroughs Corp., 407 F
Supp. 903 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Skoglund v. Singer Co., 403 F. Supp. 797 (D.N.H. 1975);
Bishop v. Jelleff Assocs., 398 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1974); Woodford v. Kinney Shoe Corp.,
369 F. Supp. 911 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
11 376 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. La. 1971).
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tory."1 In Cochran it was argued that because of the humanitarian
and remedial purposes of the Act, liberal construction was pro-
per.4" This argument, which was accepted in Dartt,43 was rejected
by Cochran as being addressed to the wrong instrumentality of
government."
The leading case for the proposition that section 626(d)(1) is
a jurisdictional requirement to maintenance of suit under the
ADEA is Powell v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.45 Powell
distinguished the more liberal judicial interpretations of Title
VII's time limitations because of the different placement, within
the statutes, of the time limitations." Under Title VII, the re-
quirement of filing a charge of discrimination is found in a differ-
ent subsection than the subsection limiting the institution of
legal actions; the ADEA time limitation for the filing of notice,
however, is found in the same subsection which limits the filing
of legal actions." The Powell court argued that this indicated a
congressional intent to make compliance with the notice require-
ment in the ADEA jurisdictional."
Within the Tenth Circuit, both the court of appeals and a
district court had previously interpreted the time limitation of
section 626(d)(1). In Burgett v. Cudahy Co.4" the United States
District Court for Kansas found, as did the Dartt district court,
that the purposes for requiring filing of notice of intent to sue
prior to commencement of a private action were two-fold: First,
" The form of the verb used is often considered in determining whether a statutory
provision is mandatory or directory. 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 32, § 57.03. For a discus-
sion on the importance of the distinction between mandatory and directory, see 2A
SUTHERLAND, supra note 32, § 57.01.
42 376 F. Supp. at 303.
539 F.2d at 1260.
" "The argument that the legislation is remedial and humanitarian and should be
construed so as not to deny relief in this case is addressed to the wrong instrumentality of
the government. Congress, not we, should decide this." 376 F. Supp. at 303.
494 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1974). The district court in Dartt cited Powell for this
proposition. 10 F.E.P. Cases at 847.
" 494 F.2d at 488.
47 The limitation in Title VII that charges must be filed within 180 days of the alleged
discrimination is found in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. II 1972), while the procedures
for filing a civil action under Title VII are found in section 2000e-5(f)(1). The 180-day
notice requirement in the ADEA is found in the section dealing with procedures for
bringing a private action, 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1970).
494 F.2d at 488.
361 F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan. 1973).
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the Secretary of Labor would be put on notice of possible viola-
tions of the Act, and the claims could be investigated in order to
determine whether agency action should be taken; second, the
alleged discriminator would be put on notice that a complaint
had been filed and could voluntarily rectify any discriminatory
practice. 0 The court in Burgett concluded that to serve these
purposes and effectuate the legislative intent, filing of notice of
intent to sue should be construed as jurisdictional.5
In Law v. United Air Lines, Inc.,5" the Tenth Circuit dealt
with an issue similar to that raised in Burgett. In a per curiam
opinion, the court adopted the trial court's holding that the lodg-
ing of notice of intent to file a civil action was a jurisdictional
prerequisite to plaintiff's cause of action, and declared itself to be
"in accord with Powell."" In Dartt, the court of appeals at-
tempted to harmonize its apparent rejection of Powell with its
holding in Law. 54 The court emphasized that in Law tolling was
not an issue because notice had been filed more than five years
after the alleged discrimination.5
Hays v. Republic Steel Corp.,"6 a Fifth Circuit case decided
only a few weeks before Dartt, took a different view of section
626(d)(1). The plaintiff in that case had made an oral complaint
to the Department of Labor and was told to file a letter of intent
to sue; he had a letter prepared but became ill and was hospital-
ized, and the letter was never mailed. 7 The Fifth Circuit found
that it could not waive a limitation period established by Con-
gress and upheld the judgment against plaintiff, holding that this
claim was barred by failure to file timely notice of intent to sue."
Notwithstanding Hays, there has been some movement re-
cently to give a liberal interpretation to the procedural require-
ments of the ADEA when possible. Although the issue often is
whether the time limitations in section 626(d)(1) are subject to
Id. at 621; Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d at 1261.
361 F. Supp. at 621-22.
52 519 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1975).
' Id. at 171.
'4 See text accompanying notes 45-48 supra.
" 539 F.2d at 1261 n.3. "The Court in Powell simply was not faced with a situation
where the equities dictated a tolling. Neither were we in Law." Id.




equitable modifications, some cases have avoided this question
and have given a tardy plaintiff relief. A case relaxing the stric-
tures of section 626(d)(1) without tolling was Woodford v. Kinney
Shoe Corp." The facts of this case were very similar to those in
Dartt. The plaintiff had failed to file notice of intent to sue within
the 180-day period, but had communicated orally with the De-
partment of Labor regarding her allegedly discriminatory dis-
charge. 0 The court held that although written notice was prefera-
ble, it was not required, and oral notice to the Department of
Labor within 180 days was sufficient notice.' The finding that
oral notice was sufficient has largely been avoided by other
courts,62 as it was by the district court in Dartt.
6 3
Methods other than the one employed in Woodford have also
been used to avoid a strict interpretation of the time requirement
of the ADEA, without actually tolling the requirement. In Moses
v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.,64 the court determined that the date
from which the 180-day period begins to run is the administrative
termination date, rather than the date on which the complainant
actually stops working. Moses' notice of intent to sue had been
given within 180 days of her administrative termination, but not
within 180 days of the date she actually stopped working.65 By
this construction of the date from which the 180-day period be-
gins to run, Moses did not have to deal with the issue of untimely
filing of notice. In Smith v. Schlitz Brewing Co.,6" a New Jersey
district court was also able to avoid tolling the time limitation by
finding that plaintiff's prompt filing of a complaint letter and
copies of correspondence with the Department of Labor fulfilled
the purposes which section 626(d)(1) was intended to serve, even
though plaintiff never specifically stated an intent to file suit.
Interestingly, this same approach was urged upon the court of
appeals in Dartt by the Department of Labor in its amicus curiae
369 F. Supp. 911 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
' Id. at 913-14.
6, Id. at 915. The issues of timeliness and tolling were not raised; instead, the court
only considered what constituted notice.
" See text accompanying note 66 infra.
"[ Woodford] disregards the clear mandate of 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) . 10 F.E.P.
Cases at 847.
525 F.2d 92 (8th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 94-95.
" 12 F.E.P. Cases 1494 (D.N.J. 1976).
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brief; however, the Dartt court did not select this route but in-
stead tolled the time limitation. 7
Cases prior to Dartt in which the time limitation of section
626(d)(1) was subject to equitable modification found some
wrong by the employer which made the employee unable to assert
his or her rights within the proper time. For example, the equita-
ble remedy of tolling in Bishop v. Jelleff Associates" was based
on the failure of the complainants' employer to post the required
ADEA notices. In reaching its decision, the court also considered
the relative "newness" of the Act, the plaintiffs' general lack of
sophistication, and their representation to the Department of
Labor that large numbers of elderly employees were being dis-
charged by the defendant employer.69 Similarly, Skoglund v.
Singer Co.70 found that section 626(d)(1) could be subject to equi-
table modifications. In holding that plaintiff's claim (that
defendant-employer had failed to post the required notices), if
proved, would be sufficient to toll the 180-day notice require-
ment, the court said: "Defendant should not benefit to plaintiff's
detriment by its failure to fulfill the responsibilities laid upon it
by Congress. It is basic to our system of justice that one should
not benefit from a wrong done to another."'"
A situation where a defendant was not allowed to benefit
from its own wrong was found in McGinley v. Burroughs Corp.7"
There, under facts similar to those in Reeb,73 the time limitations
11 The Secretary of Labor, as amicus curiae, argued that a result similar to Smith
should have been reached: "The lower court erred in dismissing this case for lack of a
timely notice of intent to sue, since the basic purposes contemplated by such notice were
fully satisfied by plaintiffs complaint to the Labor Department as a result of which
defendant was promptly notified of the asserted ADEA violation and given an opportunity
to settle it." Amicus Curiae brief by the Secretary of Labor at 15, Dartt v. Shell Oil Co.,
539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976). This argument was rejected. 539 F.2d at 1259.
398 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1974). Bishop has been distinguished by courts not
wishing to allow an employer's failure to post the required notices to excuse a tardy
plaintiff. See Eklund v. Lubrizol Corp., 529 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1976); Hiscott v. General
Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1975); Brohl v. Singer Co., 407 F. Supp. 936 (M.D. Fla.
1976).
' 398 F. Supp. at 593.
7o 403 F. Supp. 797 (D.N.H. 1975).
7' Id. at 804. At the hearing before the federal district court to determine if the
employer had failed to post the required notices as the plaintiff claimed, the notices were
found to have been properly posted and plaintiff's claim was barred, as there were no
circumstances to justify tolling. 13 F.E.P. Cases 253 (D.N.H. 1975).
72 407 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
71 See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
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of the ADEA were tolled where the plaintiff's failure to file within
the allotted time period was the result of the defendant's willfully
concealing the circumstances from which the plaintiff could have
ascertained the discrimination.74
The contrast between cases which had previously tolled the
time limitations and Dartt may be readily seen. In Dartt, the
court's decision to toll was based on factors other than the em-
ployer's wrong, because there was no wrong on the part of Shell
which prevented Dartt from asserting her claim within the proper
time. The court based its decision on the Department of Labor's
failure to advise Mrs. Dartt of the 180-day requirement.75 Mr.
Speer's usual custom was to advise complainants of this require-
ment, although there was no such statutory requirement.76 Fur-
ther, Shell's delay in providing information to assist the Wage
and Hour Division in its investigation was viewed by the court as
indirectly contributing to the Division's failure to notify Mrs.
Dartt of the time limitations before they expired.77 This finding
was made in spite of an affidavit indicating that Shell's delay was
due solely to the volume of the data requested.7" Finally, even
though Shell had posted the informational notices given it by the
Wage and Hour Division, the court found these official notices
"completely inadequate to inform Dartt as to the 180-day notice
requirement."79
CONCLUSION
The equitable conclusion reached in Dartt that the time limi-
tations of the ADEA may be tolled is not without precedent.'" But
the application of these equitable principles to the facts of Dartt
could, for all practical purposes, eliminate the 180-day require-
ment for notice of intent to sue. In previous cases, tolling occurred
407 F. Supp. at 909-10.
539 F.2d at 1262.
79 Id.
77 Id.
1, "The studies which Mr. Speer had requested were quite voluminous, and Mr. Speer
was aware that it would take several months to complete the compilation of the requested
data." Affidavit of Shell's manager of employee relations, attached to Shell's Response
to the Brief of the Amicus Curiae, Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976).
539 F.2d at 1262.
McGinley v. Burroughs Corp., 407 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Skoglund v. Singer




because of the inequitable conduct of the defendant, thereby giv-
ing effect to the maxim that one should not benefit from a wrong
done to another. The court in Dartt strained to find some wrong-
ful act on the part of Shell which could justify the application of
equity to this case, but the best it could do was to conclude that
Shell's failure to provide the Wage and Hour Division with re-
quested data contributed, in an indirect manner, to the Division's
failure to notify Mrs. Dartt of her right to sue prior to the running
of the 180-day period.8' Another "wrong" which the court cited
was the inadequacy of Shell's posted notices. However, these are
not "wrongs" which can fairly be said to be the fault of Shell, or
which should justify the equitable modification here fashioned.
There were, undoubtedly, circumstances which contributed to
Mrs. Dartt's tardy filing of notice of intent to sue. In her initial
contact with an attorney regarding her complaint, she received no
advice on how to maintain suit under the ADEA, but was merely
told to contact the Department of Labor. Had Mrs. Dartt re-
ceived more thorough legal advice at this point, the problem with
section 626(d)(1) might never have arisen. It may also have been
that the notices posted by Shell were inadequate to inform her of
her rights and duties under the ADEA. But again, this was no
fault of Shell's. The printed notice was furnished Shell by the
Department of Labor, and a reading of section 627 of the ADEA
which requires the posting of such notices can only lead to the
conclusion that the Department of Labor deemed these notices
"appropriate to effectuate the purposes of [the Act]."
It seems that the court determined that Mrs. Dartt's efforts
to present her cause, though thwarted by a series of circumstan-
ces (none of which was her employer's fault), were nonetheless
diligent and therefore deserving of the court's power to fashion
equitable modifications. This decision is in clear contravention of
the statute, and while admittedly the requirements of the statute
may be tolled, the factors necessary to support the maxims of
equity are not present in the facts of Dartt.5 3
1 See text accompanying note 71 supra for a discussion of one court's determination
of the effect of wrong-doing by the employer.
11 "Every employer, employment agency and labor organization shall post and keep
posted in conspicuous places upon its premises a notice to be prepared or approved by
the Secretary setting forth information as the Secretary deems appropriate to effectuate
the purposes of this chapter." 29 U.S.C. § 627 (1970).
0 1 PomERoy's EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 363 (3d ed. 1905).
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Mrs. Dartt was allowed by the court to sue Shell although she
failed to meet the statutory requirements to maintain suit, and
even though the cause of her failure did not lie with Shell. It
seems less than a truly equitable remedy to penalize the employer
in such a situation. Perhaps such circumstances could be avoided
in the future by requiring the Department of Labor to notify
complainants of the 180-day requirement, or requiring the De-
partment of Labor to prepare ADEA notices for employers to post
which set out more specifically the rights and duties under the
ADEA.
As suggested in the opinion of the court which first had occa-
sion to interpret this section of the ADEA, decisions which serve
to change or modify statutory requirements are more properly a
legislative function left to Congress."4 However, in light of the
conflict between the Tenth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit," a final
decision by the United States Supreme Court might make clear
the question of whether section 626(d) is jurisdictional and if not,
under what circumstances equitable modifications might apply.
Cathleen Osborn Brandt
' Cochran v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Co., 376 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. La. 1971). See note
44 supra.
In Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976), the court stated
that it could not waive a limitation period established by Congress, while Dartt found that
it could waive such limitation.
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